IICLE Family Law Flash Points - March 2021

Trial Court Erred in Applying 2019 Version of IMDMA Maintenance Statute, Ruled Harmless Because Correct Calculation Was Applied

The Second District addressed the question of which version of the maintenance statute under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILCS 5/101, et seq., applied to a December 2018 petition to set maintenance based on language in a marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered in August 2018. In re Marriage of Wig, 2020 IL App (2d) 190929. The wife was ordered to pay the husband maintenance, but days after the judgment was entered the wife lost her job. Months later, she obtained new employment with a salary consistent with her former employment, and the husband filed a motion to set maintenance based on the language in the MSA that delineated how maintenance was to be calculated. The language in the MSA provided for the use of the 2018 maintenance formula and for the includability/deductibility of maintenance on the parties’ respective tax returns. The parties stipulated that the husband would receive $423 in monthly maintenance under the 2018 version of the statute and $3 per month under the 2019 version. 2020 IL App (2d) 190929 at ¶11. The trial court ruled that the 2019 statute was the correct statute to apply, but treated the proceeding as a modification proceeding under §504(b-1)(1)(A-1), so that the 2018 guideline formula applied to the calculation. The appellate court disagreed and held that the plain language of the MSA clearly and unambiguously provided how maintenance was to be calculated, and therefore that language must be followed. The petition to set maintenance filed by the husband was not a modification proceeding, but rather a petition to set maintenance in accordance with the terms the parties had agreed to in the MSA. The trial court’s error in reasoning was harmless, however, because it ultimately reached the right calculation, and therefore the judgment was affirmed.

Second District Opines on Issue of Unconscionability as to Application of 2018 and 2019 Versions of Maintenance Statute

In Wig, supra, in which the issue presented to the appellate court was whether the 2018 or 2019 version of the maintenance statute of the IMDMA applied, the court ultimately held that the trial court incorrectly framed the issue. In fact, the plain language of the MSA clearly and unambiguously provided precisely how the calculation was to occur. The language controlled, and the trial court did not need to determine which statute was properly applied to the issue before it. The significant difference was that under the 2018 statute (which provided for a calculation based on gross income), the husband was to receive $423 per month in maintenance, while under the 2019 statute (which provided for a calculation based on net income), he would have received $3 per month in maintenance. The Second District opined in dicta that although neither party argued unconscionability of the application of the 2019 statute to the ultimate maintenance award, interpreting the MSA consistent with the 2019 version would have rendered the MSA unconscionable because “[n]o sensible person would offer, and no fair-minded person would accept, $3 in monthly maintenance.” 2020 IL App (2d) 190929 at ¶20.